From: Matt Caswell Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2025 15:58:53 +0000 (+0000) Subject: Delete the RSA EVP_PKEY_METHOD X-Git-Url: https://git.feebdaed.xyz/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=b7d69bad17e54111174b981788ab2a17854cca5c;p=0xmirror%2Fopenssl.git Delete the RSA EVP_PKEY_METHOD It is no longer used so can be removed Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis Reviewed-by: Paul Yang (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/29384) --- diff --git a/crypto/rsa/build.info b/crypto/rsa/build.info index ad3370db39..bf5316883e 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/build.info +++ b/crypto/rsa/build.info @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ $COMMON=rsa_ossl.c rsa_gen.c rsa_lib.c rsa_sign.c rsa_pk1.c \ SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=$COMMON\ rsa_saos.c rsa_err.c rsa_asn1.c rsa_ameth.c rsa_prn.c \ - rsa_pmeth.c rsa_meth.c rsa_mp.c + rsa_meth.c rsa_mp.c IF[{- !$disabled{'deprecated-0.9.8'} -}] SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=rsa_depr.c ENDIF diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c deleted file mode 100644 index dfc9537b3a..0000000000 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,935 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright 2006-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. - * - * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use - * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy - * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at - * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html - */ - -/* - * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for - * internal use. - */ -#include "internal/deprecated.h" - -#include "internal/constant_time.h" - -#include -#include "internal/cryptlib.h" -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include "crypto/evp.h" -#include "crypto/rsa.h" -#include "rsa_local.h" - -/* RSA pkey context structure */ - -typedef struct { - /* Key gen parameters */ - int nbits; - BIGNUM *pub_exp; - int primes; - /* Keygen callback info */ - int gentmp[2]; - /* RSA padding mode */ - int pad_mode; - /* message digest */ - const EVP_MD *md; - /* message digest for MGF1 */ - const EVP_MD *mgf1md; - /* PSS salt length */ - int saltlen; - /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */ - int min_saltlen; - /* Temp buffer */ - unsigned char *tbuf; - /* OAEP label */ - unsigned char *oaep_label; - size_t oaep_labellen; - /* if to use implicit rejection in PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption */ - int implicit_rejection; -} RSA_PKEY_CTX; - -/* True if PSS parameters are restricted */ -#define rsa_pss_restricted(rctx) (rctx->min_saltlen != -1) - -static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) -{ - RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*rctx)); - - if (rctx == NULL) - return 0; - rctx->nbits = 2048; - rctx->primes = RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM; - if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) - rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING; - else - rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; - /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */ - rctx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO; - rctx->min_saltlen = -1; - rctx->implicit_rejection = 1; - ctx->data = rctx; - ctx->keygen_info = rctx->gentmp; - ctx->keygen_info_count = 2; - - return 1; -} - -static int pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, const EVP_PKEY_CTX *src) -{ - RSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx; - - if (!pkey_rsa_init(dst)) - return 0; - sctx = src->data; - dctx = dst->data; - dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits; - if (sctx->pub_exp) { - dctx->pub_exp = BN_dup(sctx->pub_exp); - if (!dctx->pub_exp) - return 0; - } - dctx->pad_mode = sctx->pad_mode; - dctx->md = sctx->md; - dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md; - dctx->saltlen = sctx->saltlen; - dctx->implicit_rejection = sctx->implicit_rejection; - if (sctx->oaep_label) { - OPENSSL_free(dctx->oaep_label); - dctx->oaep_label = OPENSSL_memdup(sctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_labellen); - if (!dctx->oaep_label) - return 0; - dctx->oaep_labellen = sctx->oaep_labellen; - } - return 1; -} - -static int setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk) -{ - if (ctx->tbuf != NULL) - return 1; - if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pk->pkey)))) == NULL) - return 0; - return 1; -} - -static void pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) -{ - RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; - if (rctx) { - BN_free(rctx->pub_exp); - OPENSSL_free(rctx->tbuf); - OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label); - OPENSSL_free(rctx); - } -} - -static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, - size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, - size_t tbslen) -{ - int ret; - RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; - /* - * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of - * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to - * be reflected back in the "original" key. - */ - RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey); - int md_size; - - if (rctx->md) { - md_size = EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md); - if (md_size <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); - return -1; - } - - if (tbslen != (size_t)md_size) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); - return -1; - } - - if (EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md) == NID_mdc2) { - unsigned int sltmp; - if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) - return -1; - ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, (int)tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa); - - if (ret <= 0) - return ret; - ret = sltmp; - } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) { - if ((size_t)RSA_size(rsa) < tbslen + 1) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); - return -1; - } - if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); - return -1; - } - memcpy(rctx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen); - rctx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md)); - ret = RSA_private_encrypt((int)(tbslen + 1), rctx->tbuf, - sig, rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING); - } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { - unsigned int sltmp; - ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md), - tbs, (unsigned int)tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa); - if (ret <= 0) - return ret; - ret = sltmp; - } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { - if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) - return -1; - if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, - rctx->tbuf, tbs, - rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md, - rctx->saltlen)) - return -1; - ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(rsa), rctx->tbuf, - sig, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); - } else { - return -1; - } - } else { - ret = RSA_private_encrypt((int)tbslen, tbs, sig, rsa, rctx->pad_mode); - } - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - *siglen = ret; - return 1; -} - -static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, - unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen, - const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen) -{ - int ret; - RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; - /* - * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of - * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to - * be reflected back in the "original" key. - */ - RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey); - - if (rctx->md) { - if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) { - if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) - return -1; - ret = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, rsa, - RSA_X931_PADDING); - if (ret <= 0) - return 0; - ret--; - if (rctx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md))) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH); - return 0; - } - if (ret != EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md)) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - if (rout) - memcpy(rout, rctx->tbuf, ret); - } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { - size_t sltmp; - ret = ossl_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md), - NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp, - sig, siglen, rsa); - if (ret <= 0) - return 0; - ret = (int)sltmp; - } else { - return -1; - } - } else { - ret = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sig, rout, rsa, rctx->pad_mode); - } - if (ret <= 0) - return ret; - *routlen = ret; - return 1; -} - -static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, - const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, - const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) -{ - RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; - /* - * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of - * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to - * be reflected back in the "original" key. - */ - RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey); - size_t rslen; - int md_size; - - if (rctx->md) { - if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) - return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md), tbs, (unsigned int)tbslen, - sig, (unsigned int)siglen, rsa); - md_size = EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md); - if (md_size <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); - return -1; - } - if (tbslen != (size_t)md_size) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); - return -1; - } - if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) { - if (pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(ctx, NULL, &rslen, sig, siglen) <= 0) - return 0; - } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { - int ret; - if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) - return -1; - ret = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, - rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); - if (ret <= 0) - return 0; - ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs, - rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md, - rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen); - if (ret <= 0) - return 0; - return 1; - } else { - return -1; - } - } else { - if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) - return -1; - rslen = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, - rsa, rctx->pad_mode); - if (rslen <= 0) - return 0; - } - - if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, rctx->tbuf, rslen)) - return 0; - - return 1; -} - -static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, - unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, - const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) -{ - int ret; - RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; - /* - * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of - * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to - * be reflected back in the "original" key. - */ - RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey); - - if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { - int klen = RSA_size(rsa); - if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) - return -1; - if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(rctx->tbuf, klen, - in, (int)inlen, - rctx->oaep_label, - (int)rctx->oaep_labellen, - rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md)) - return -1; - ret = RSA_public_encrypt(klen, rctx->tbuf, out, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); - } else { - ret = RSA_public_encrypt((int)inlen, in, out, rsa, rctx->pad_mode); - } - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - *outlen = ret; - return 1; -} - -static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, - unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, - const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) -{ - int ret; - int pad_mode; - RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; - /* - * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of - * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to - * be reflected back in the "original" key. - */ - RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey); - - if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { - if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) - return -1; - ret = RSA_private_decrypt((int)inlen, in, rctx->tbuf, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); - if (ret <= 0) - return ret; - ret = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(out, ret, rctx->tbuf, - ret, ret, - rctx->oaep_label, - (int)rctx->oaep_labellen, - rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md); - } else { - if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING && rctx->implicit_rejection == 0) - pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING; - else - pad_mode = rctx->pad_mode; - ret = RSA_private_decrypt((int)inlen, in, out, rsa, pad_mode); - } - *outlen = constant_time_select_s(constant_time_msb_s(ret), *outlen, ret); - ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_msb(ret), ret, 1); - return ret; -} - -static int check_padding_md(const EVP_MD *md, int padding) -{ - int mdnid; - - if (!md) - return 1; - - mdnid = EVP_MD_get_type(md); - - if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); - return 0; - } - - if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) { - if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST); - return 0; - } - } else { - switch (mdnid) { - /* List of all supported RSA digests */ - case NID_sha1: - case NID_sha224: - case NID_sha256: - case NID_sha384: - case NID_sha512: - case NID_sha512_224: - case NID_sha512_256: - case NID_md5: - case NID_md5_sha1: - case NID_md2: - case NID_md4: - case NID_mdc2: - case NID_ripemd160: - case NID_sha3_224: - case NID_sha3_256: - case NID_sha3_384: - case NID_sha3_512: - return 1; - - default: - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST); - return 0; - } - } - - return 1; -} - -static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) -{ - RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; - int md_size; - - switch (type) { - case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING: - if ((p1 >= RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) && (p1 <= RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)) { - if (!check_padding_md(rctx->md, p1)) - return 0; - if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { - if (!(ctx->operation & (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY))) - goto bad_pad; - if (!rctx->md) - rctx->md = EVP_sha1(); - } else if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) { - goto bad_pad; - } - if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { - if (!(ctx->operation & EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT)) - goto bad_pad; - if (!rctx->md) - rctx->md = EVP_sha1(); - } - rctx->pad_mode = p1; - return 1; - } - bad_pad: - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE); - return -2; - - case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING: - *(int *)p2 = rctx->pad_mode; - return 1; - - case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN: - case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN: - if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN); - return -2; - } - if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN) { - *(int *)p2 = rctx->saltlen; - } else { - if (p1 < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) - return -2; - if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) { - if (p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO - && ctx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN); - return -2; - } - md_size = EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md); - if (md_size <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); - return -2; - } - if ((p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST - && rctx->min_saltlen > md_size) - || (p1 >= 0 && p1 < rctx->min_saltlen)) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL); - return 0; - } - } - rctx->saltlen = p1; - } - return 1; - - case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS: - if (p1 < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); - return -2; - } - rctx->nbits = p1; - return 1; - - case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP: - if (p2 == NULL || !BN_is_odd((BIGNUM *)p2) || BN_is_one((BIGNUM *)p2)) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); - return -2; - } - BN_free(rctx->pub_exp); - rctx->pub_exp = p2; - return 1; - - case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PRIMES: - if (p1 < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM || p1 > RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID); - return -2; - } - rctx->primes = p1; - return 1; - - case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD: - case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD: - if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); - return -2; - } - if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD) - *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md; - else - rctx->md = p2; - return 1; - - case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD: - if (!check_padding_md(p2, rctx->pad_mode)) - return 0; - if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) { - if (EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md) == EVP_MD_get_type(p2)) - return 1; - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED); - return 0; - } - rctx->md = p2; - return 1; - - case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD: - *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md; - return 1; - - case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD: - case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD: - if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING - && rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD); - return -2; - } - if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD) { - if (rctx->mgf1md) - *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->mgf1md; - else - *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md; - } else { - if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) { - if (EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->mgf1md) == EVP_MD_get_type(p2)) - return 1; - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_MGF1_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED); - return 0; - } - rctx->mgf1md = p2; - } - return 1; - - case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL: - if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); - return -2; - } - OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label); - if (p2 && p1 > 0) { - rctx->oaep_label = p2; - rctx->oaep_labellen = p1; - } else { - rctx->oaep_label = NULL; - rctx->oaep_labellen = 0; - } - return 1; - - case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL: - if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); - return -2; - } - if (p2 == NULL) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); - return 0; - } - *(unsigned char **)p2 = rctx->oaep_label; - return (int)rctx->oaep_labellen; - - case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_IMPLICIT_REJECTION: - if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); - return -2; - } - rctx->implicit_rejection = p1; - return 1; - - case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT: - case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN: -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS - case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN: -#endif - return 1; - - case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT: - case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT: -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS - case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT: - case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT: -#endif - if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) - return 1; - /* fall through */ - case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY: - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); - return -2; - - default: - return -2; - } -} - -static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, - const char *type, const char *value) -{ - if (value == NULL) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING); - return 0; - } - if (strcmp(type, "rsa_padding_mode") == 0) { - int pm; - - if (strcmp(value, "pkcs1") == 0) { - pm = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; - } else if (strcmp(value, "none") == 0) { - pm = RSA_NO_PADDING; - } else if (strcmp(value, "oeap") == 0) { - pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING; - } else if (strcmp(value, "oaep") == 0) { - pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING; - } else if (strcmp(value, "x931") == 0) { - pm = RSA_X931_PADDING; - } else if (strcmp(value, "pss") == 0) { - pm = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING; - } else { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); - return -2; - } - return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, pm); - } - - if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_saltlen") == 0) { - int saltlen; - - if (!strcmp(value, "digest")) - saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST; - else if (!strcmp(value, "max")) - saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX; - else if (!strcmp(value, "auto")) - saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO; - else - saltlen = atoi(value); - return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, saltlen); - } - - if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_bits") == 0) { - int nbits = atoi(value); - - return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, nbits); - } - - if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_pubexp") == 0) { - int ret; - - BIGNUM *pubexp = NULL; - if (!BN_asc2bn(&pubexp, value)) - return 0; - ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, pubexp); - BN_free(pubexp); - return ret; - } - - if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_primes") == 0) { - int nprimes = atoi(value); - - return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes(ctx, nprimes); - } - - if (strcmp(type, "rsa_mgf1_md") == 0) - return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, - EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, - EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value); - - if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) { - - if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md") == 0) - return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, - EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value); - - if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_md") == 0) - return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, - EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, value); - - if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen") == 0) { - int saltlen = atoi(value); - - return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen(ctx, saltlen); - } - } - - if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_md") == 0) - return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, - EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, value); - - if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_label") == 0) { - unsigned char *lab; - long lablen; - int ret; - - lab = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(value, &lablen); - if (!lab) - return 0; - ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, lab, lablen); - if (ret <= 0) - OPENSSL_free(lab); - return ret; - } - - return -2; -} - -/* Set PSS parameters when generating a key, if necessary */ -static int rsa_set_pss_param(RSA *rsa, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) -{ - RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; - - if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) - return 1; - /* If all parameters are default values don't set pss */ - if (rctx->md == NULL && rctx->mgf1md == NULL && rctx->saltlen == -2) - return 1; - rsa->pss = ossl_rsa_pss_params_create(rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md, - rctx->saltlen == -2 - ? 0 - : rctx->saltlen); - if (rsa->pss == NULL) - return 0; - return 1; -} - -static int pkey_rsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) -{ - RSA *rsa = NULL; - RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; - BN_GENCB *pcb; - int ret; - - if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL) { - rctx->pub_exp = BN_new(); - if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL || !BN_set_word(rctx->pub_exp, RSA_F4)) - return 0; - } - rsa = RSA_new(); - if (rsa == NULL) - return 0; - if (ctx->pkey_gencb) { - pcb = BN_GENCB_new(); - if (pcb == NULL) { - RSA_free(rsa); - return 0; - } - evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx); - } else { - pcb = NULL; - } - ret = RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->primes, - rctx->pub_exp, pcb); - BN_GENCB_free(pcb); - if (ret > 0 && !rsa_set_pss_param(rsa, ctx)) { - RSA_free(rsa); - return 0; - } - if (ret > 0) - EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, ctx->pmeth->pkey_id, rsa); - else - RSA_free(rsa); - return ret; -} - -static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth = { - EVP_PKEY_RSA, - EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN, - pkey_rsa_init, - pkey_rsa_copy, - pkey_rsa_cleanup, - - 0, 0, - - 0, - pkey_rsa_keygen, - - 0, - pkey_rsa_sign, - - 0, - pkey_rsa_verify, - - 0, - pkey_rsa_verifyrecover, - - 0, 0, 0, 0, - - 0, - pkey_rsa_encrypt, - - 0, - pkey_rsa_decrypt, - - 0, 0, - - pkey_rsa_ctrl, - pkey_rsa_ctrl_str -}; - -const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pkey_method(void) -{ - return &rsa_pkey_meth; -} - -/* - * Called for PSS sign or verify initialisation: checks PSS parameter - * sanity and sets any restrictions on key usage. - */ - -static int pkey_pss_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) -{ - const RSA *rsa; - RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; - const EVP_MD *md; - const EVP_MD *mgf1md; - int min_saltlen, max_saltlen, md_size; - - /* Should never happen */ - if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) - return 0; - rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey); - /* If no restrictions just return */ - if (rsa->pss == NULL) - return 1; - /* Get and check parameters */ - if (!ossl_rsa_pss_get_param(rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md, &min_saltlen)) - return 0; - - /* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */ - md_size = EVP_MD_get_size(md); - if (md_size <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - max_saltlen = RSA_size(rsa) - md_size; - if ((RSA_bits(rsa) & 0x7) == 1) - max_saltlen--; - if (min_saltlen > max_saltlen) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - - rctx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen; - - /* - * Set PSS restrictions as defaults: we can then block any attempt to - * use invalid values in pkey_rsa_ctrl - */ - - rctx->md = md; - rctx->mgf1md = mgf1md; - rctx->saltlen = min_saltlen; - - return 1; -} - -static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pss_pkey_meth = { - EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, - EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN, - pkey_rsa_init, - pkey_rsa_copy, - pkey_rsa_cleanup, - - 0, 0, - - 0, - pkey_rsa_keygen, - - pkey_pss_init, - pkey_rsa_sign, - - pkey_pss_init, - pkey_rsa_verify, - - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - - pkey_rsa_ctrl, - pkey_rsa_ctrl_str -}; - -const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pss_pkey_method(void) -{ - return &rsa_pss_pkey_meth; -}